Fix several errors including:
- Unaligned memory access to 'Length of Error Text' field
- No validation of 'Length of Encapsulated PDU' field
- No validation of 'Error Code' field
- No validation of characters in diagnostic message
We shouldn't convert bytes 2 and 3 of the PDU blindly, there are several
cases where these are used by bytes. Instead, the conversion is done
only where needed.
This fixes misinterpretation bug of ASPA PDU flags on little endian
architectures.
The END_OF_DATA PDU was extended in version 1, so it has different length
in different versions. We should do the PDU length check according to its
version.
Until now, we were marking routes as REF_STALE and REF_DISCARD to
cleanup old routes after route refresh. This needed a synchronous route
table walk at both beginning and the end of route refresh routine,
marking the routes by the flags.
We avoid these walks by using a stale counter. Every route contains:
u8 stale_cycle;
Every import hook contains:
u8 stale_set;
u8 stale_valid;
u8 stale_pruned;
u8 stale_pruning;
In base_state, stale_set == stale_valid == stale_pruned == stale_pruning
and all routes' stale_cycle also have the same value.
The route refresh looks like follows:
+ ----------- + --------- + ----------- + ------------- + ------------ +
| | stale_set | stale_valid | stale_pruning | stale_pruned |
| Base | x | x | x | x |
| Begin | x+1 | x | x | x |
... now routes are being inserted with stale_cycle == (x+1)
| End | x+1 | x+1 | x | x |
... now table pruning routine is scheduled
| Prune begin | x+1 | x+1 | x+1 | x |
... now routes with stale_cycle not between stale_set and stale_valid
are deleted
| Prune end | x+1 | x+1 | x+1 | x+1 |
+ ----------- + --------- + ----------- + ------------- + ------------ +
The pruning routine is asynchronous and may have high latency in
high-load environments. Therefore, multiple route refresh requests may
happen before the pruning routine starts, leading to this situation:
| Prune begin | x+k | x+k | x -> x+k | x |
... or even
| Prune begin | x+k+1 | x+k | x -> x+k | x |
... if the prune event starts while another route refresh is running.
In such a case, the pruning routine still deletes routes not fitting
between stale_set and and stale_valid, effectively pruning the remnants
of all unpruned route refreshes from before:
| Prune end | x+k | x+k | x+k | x+k |
In extremely rare cases, there may happen too many route refreshes
before any route prune routine finishes. If the difference between
stale_valid and stale_pruned becomes more than 128 when requesting for
another route refresh, the routine walks the table synchronously and
resets all the stale values to a base state, while logging a warning.
RFC 6810 and RFC 8210 specify that the "Max Length" value MUST NOT be
less than the Prefix Length element (underflow). On the other side,
overflow of the Max Length element also is possible, it being an 8-bit
unsigned integer allows for values larger than 32 or 128. This also
implicitly ensures there is no overflow of "Length" value.
When a PDU is received where the Max Length field is corrputed, the RTR
client (BIRD) should immediately terminate the session, flush all data
learned from that cache, and log an error for the operator.
Minor changes done by commiter.
* internal tables are now more standalone, having their own import and
export hooks
* route refresh/reload uses stale counter instead of stale flag,
allowing to drop walking the table at the beginning
* route modify (by BGP LLGR) is now done by a special refeed hook,
reimporting the modified routes directly without filters
Channels have now included rt_import_req and rt_export_req to hook into
the table instead of just one list node. This will (in future) allow for:
* channel import and export bound to different tables
* more efficient pipe code (dropping most of the channel code)
* conversion of 'show route' to a special kind of export
* temporary static routes from CLI
The import / export states are also updated to the new algorithms.
Add 'ignore max length' option to RPKI protocol, which ignores received
max length in ROA records and instead uses max value (32 or 128). This
may be useful for implementing loose RPKI check for blackholes.
