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S2OJ/judger/uoj_judger/run/run_program_sandbox.h

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#include <iostream>
#include <sstream>
#include <cstdio>
#include <cstdlib>
#include <cstring>
#include <string>
#include <fstream>
#include <vector>
#include <set>
#include <algorithm>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/user.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <argp.h>
#include <seccomp.h>
#include "uoj_run.h"
enum EX_CHECK_TYPE : unsigned {
ECT_NONE = 0,
ECT_CNT = 1,
ECT_FILE_OP = 1 << 1, // it is a file operation
ECT_END_AT = 1 << 2, // this file operation ends with "at" (e.g., openat)
ECT_FILEAT_OP = ECT_FILE_OP | ECT_END_AT, // it is a file operation ended with "at"
ECT_FILE_W = 1 << 3, // intend to write
ECT_FILE_R = 1 << 4, // intend to read
ECT_FILE_S = 1 << 5, // intend to stat
ECT_CHECK_OPEN_FLAGS = 1 << 6, // check flags to determine whether it is to read/write (for open and openat)
ECT_FILE2_W = 1 << 7, // intend to write (2nd file)
ECT_FILE2_R = 1 << 8, // intend to read (2nd file)
ECT_FILE2_S = 1 << 9, // intend to stat (2nd file)
ECT_CLONE_THREAD = 1 << 10, // for clone(). Check that clone is making a non-suspicious thread
ECT_KILL_SIG0_ALLOWED = 1 << 11, // forbid kill but killing with sig0 is allowed
};
struct syscall_info {
EX_CHECK_TYPE extra_check;
int max_cnt;
bool should_soft_ban = false;
bool is_kill = false;
syscall_info()
: extra_check(ECT_CNT), max_cnt(0) {}
syscall_info(unsigned extra_check, int max_cnt)
: extra_check((EX_CHECK_TYPE)extra_check), max_cnt(max_cnt) {}
static syscall_info unlimited() {
return syscall_info(ECT_NONE, -1);
}
static syscall_info count_based(int max_cnt) {
return syscall_info(ECT_CNT, max_cnt);
}
static syscall_info with_extra_check(unsigned extra_check, int max_cnt = -1) {
if (max_cnt != -1) {
extra_check |= ECT_CNT;
}
return syscall_info(extra_check, max_cnt);
}
static syscall_info kill_type_syscall(unsigned extra_check = ECT_CNT, int max_cnt = 0) {
if (max_cnt != -1) {
extra_check |= ECT_CNT;
}
syscall_info res(extra_check, max_cnt);
res.is_kill = true;
return res;
}
static syscall_info soft_ban() {
syscall_info res(ECT_CNT, 0);
res.should_soft_ban = true;
return res;
}
};
#include "run_program_conf.h"
namespace fs = std::filesystem;
using namespace std;
typedef unsigned long long int reg_val_t;
#define REG_SYSCALL orig_rax
#define REG_RET rax
#define REG_ARG0 rdi
#define REG_ARG1 rsi
#define REG_ARG2 rdx
#define REG_ARG3 rcx
enum CHILD_PROC_FLAG : unsigned {
CPF_STARTUP = 1u << 0,
CPF_IGNORE_ONE_SIGSTOP = 1u << 2
};
struct rp_child_proc {
pid_t pid;
unsigned flags;
struct user_regs_struct reg = {};
int syscall = -1;
string error;
bool suspicious = false;
bool try_to_create_new_process = false;
void set_error_for_suspicious(const string &error);
void set_error_for_kill();
void soft_ban_syscall(int set_no);
bool check_safe_syscall();
bool check_file_permission(const string &op, const string &fn, char mode);
};
const size_t MAX_PATH_LEN = 512;
const uint64_t MAX_FD_ID = 1 << 20;
const string INVALID_PATH(PATH_MAX + 8, 'X');
const string EMPTY_PATH_AFTER_FD = "?empty_path_after_fd";
runp::config run_program_config;
set<string> writable_file_name_set;
set<string> readable_file_name_set;
set<string> statable_file_name_set;
set<string> soft_ban_file_name_set;
syscall_info syscall_info_set[N_SYSCALL];
pid_t get_tgid_from_pid(pid_t pid) {
ifstream fin("/proc/" + to_string(pid) + "/status");
string key;
while (fin >> key) {
if (key == "Tgid:") {
pid_t tgid;
if (fin >> tgid) {
return tgid;
} else {
return -1;
}
}
}
return -1;
}
bool is_len_valid_path(const string &path) {
return !path.empty() && path.size() <= MAX_PATH_LEN;
}
string path_or_len_invalid(const string &path) {
return is_len_valid_path(path) ? path : INVALID_PATH;
}
string basename(const string &path) {
if (!is_len_valid_path(path)) {
return INVALID_PATH;
}
size_t p = path.rfind('/');
if (p == string::npos) {
return path;
} else {
return path.substr(p + 1); // can be empty, e.g., path = "abc/"
}
}
string dirname(const string &path) {
if (!is_len_valid_path(path)) {
return INVALID_PATH;
}
size_t p = path.rfind('/');
if (p == string::npos) {
return INVALID_PATH;
} else {
return path.substr(0, p); // can be empty, e.g., path = "/abc"
}
}
string realpath(const string &path) {
if (!is_len_valid_path(path)) {
return INVALID_PATH;
}
static char real[PATH_MAX + 1] = {};
if (realpath(path.c_str(), real) == NULL) {
return INVALID_PATH;
}
return path_or_len_invalid(real);
}
string realpath_for_write(const string &path) {
string real = realpath(path);
if (!is_len_valid_path(path)) {
return INVALID_PATH;
}
string b = basename(path);
if (!is_len_valid_path(b) || b == "." || b == "..") {
return INVALID_PATH;
}
real = realpath(dirname(path));
if (!is_len_valid_path(real)) {
return INVALID_PATH;
}
return path_or_len_invalid(real + "/" + b);
}
string readlink(const string &path) {
if (!is_len_valid_path(path)) {
return INVALID_PATH;
}
static char buf[MAX_PATH_LEN + 1];
ssize_t n = readlink(path.c_str(), buf, MAX_PATH_LEN + 1);
if (n > (ssize_t)MAX_PATH_LEN) {
return INVALID_PATH;
} else {
buf[n] = '\0';
return path_or_len_invalid(buf);
}
}
string getcwd() {
char cwd[MAX_PATH_LEN + 1];
if (getcwd(cwd, MAX_PATH_LEN) == NULL) {
return INVALID_PATH;
} else {
return path_or_len_invalid(cwd);
}
}
string getcwdp(pid_t pid) {
return realpath("/proc/" + (pid == 0 ? "self" : to_string(pid)) + "/cwd");
}
string abspath(const string &path, pid_t pid, int fd = AT_FDCWD) {
static int depth = 0;
if (depth == 10 || !is_len_valid_path(path)) {
return INVALID_PATH;
}
vector<string> lv;
for (string cur = path; is_len_valid_path(cur); cur = dirname(cur)) {
lv.push_back(basename(cur));
}
reverse(lv.begin(), lv.end());
string pos;
if (path[0] == '/') {
pos = "/";
} else if (fd == AT_FDCWD) {
pos = getcwdp(pid);
} else {
depth++;
pos = abspath("/proc/self/fd/" + to_string(fd), pid);
depth--;
}
if (!is_len_valid_path(pos)) {
return INVALID_PATH;
}
struct stat stat_buf;
bool reachable = true;
for (auto &v : lv) {
if (reachable) {
if (lstat(pos.c_str(), &stat_buf) < 0 || !S_ISDIR(stat_buf.st_mode)) {
reachable = false;
}
}
if (reachable) {
if (v == ".") {
continue;
} else if (v == "..") {
pos = dirname(pos);
if (pos.empty()) {
pos = "/";
}
continue;
}
}
if (v.empty()) {
continue;
}
if (pos.back() != '/') {
pos += '/';
}
pos += v;
if (pos.size() > MAX_PATH_LEN) {
return INVALID_PATH;
}
if (reachable) {
string realpos;
if (pos == "/proc/self") {
realpos = "/proc/" + to_string(get_tgid_from_pid(pid));
} else if (pos == "/proc/thread-self") {
realpos = "/proc/" + to_string(get_tgid_from_pid(pid)) + "/" + to_string(pid);
} else {
if (lstat(pos.c_str(), &stat_buf) < 0) {
reachable = false;
continue;
}
if (!S_ISLNK(stat_buf.st_mode)) {
continue;
}
realpos = readlink(pos);
if (!is_len_valid_path(realpos)) {
return INVALID_PATH;
}
if (realpos[0] != '/') {
realpos = dirname(pos) + "/" + realpos;
}
}
depth++;
realpos = abspath(realpos, pid);
depth--;
if (!is_len_valid_path(realpos)) {
return INVALID_PATH;
}
pos = realpos;
}
}
return path_or_len_invalid(pos);
}
string getfdp(pid_t pid, int fd) {
if (fd == AT_FDCWD) {
return getcwdp(pid);
} else {
return abspath("/proc/self/fd/" + to_string(fd), pid);
}
}
inline bool is_in_set_smart(string name, const set<string> &s) {
if (name.size() > MAX_PATH_LEN) {
return false;
}
if (s.count(name)) {
return true;
}
int level;
for (level = 0; !name.empty(); name = dirname(name), level++) {
if (level == 1 && s.count(name + "/*")) {
return true;
}
if (s.count(name + "/")) {
return true;
}
}
if (level == 1 && s.count("/*")) {
return true;
}
if (s.count("/")) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
inline bool is_writable_file(string name) {
if (name == "/") {
return writable_file_name_set.count("system_root");
}
return is_in_set_smart(name, writable_file_name_set);
}
inline bool is_readable_file(const string &name) {
if (name == "/") {
return readable_file_name_set.count("system_root");
}
return is_in_set_smart(name, readable_file_name_set);
}
inline bool is_statable_file(const string &name) {
if (name == "/") {
return statable_file_name_set.count("system_root");
}
return is_in_set_smart(name, statable_file_name_set);
}
inline bool is_soft_ban_file(const string &name) {
if (name == "/") {
return soft_ban_file_name_set.count("system_root");
}
return is_in_set_smart(name, soft_ban_file_name_set);
}
void add_file_permission(const string &file_name, char mode) {
if (file_name.empty()) {
return;
}
if (mode == 'w') {
writable_file_name_set.insert(file_name);
} else if (mode == 'r') {
readable_file_name_set.insert(file_name);
} else if (mode == 's') {
statable_file_name_set.insert(file_name);
}
if (file_name == "system_root") {
return;
}
for (string name = dirname(file_name); !name.empty(); name = dirname(name)) {
statable_file_name_set.insert(name);
}
}
void init_conf() {
const runp::config &config = run_program_config;
add_file_permission(config.work_path, 'r');
add_file_permission(config.work_path + "/", 's');
if (folder_program_type_set.count(config.type)) {
add_file_permission(realpath(config.program_name) + "/", 'r');
} else {
add_file_permission(realpath(config.program_name), 'r');
}
vector<string> loads;
loads.push_back("default");
if (config.allow_proc) {
loads.push_back("allow_proc");
}
if (config.type != "default") {
loads.push_back(config.type);
}
for (string type : loads) {
if (allowed_syscall_list.count(type)) {
for (const auto &kv : allowed_syscall_list[type]) {
syscall_info_set[kv.first] = kv.second;
}
}
if (soft_ban_file_name_list.count(type)) {
for (const auto &name : soft_ban_file_name_list[type]) {
soft_ban_file_name_set.insert(name);
}
}
if (statable_file_name_list.count(type)) {
for (const auto &name : statable_file_name_list[type]) {
add_file_permission(name, 's');
}
}
if (readable_file_name_list.count(type)) {
for (const auto &name : readable_file_name_list[type]) {
add_file_permission(name, 'r');
}
}
if (writable_file_name_list.count(type)) {
for (const auto &name : writable_file_name_list[type]) {
add_file_permission(name, 'w');
}
}
}
for (const auto &name : config.readable_file_names) {
add_file_permission(name, 'r');
}
for (const auto &name : config.writable_file_names) {
add_file_permission(name, 'w');
}
if (config.type == "python2.7" || config.type == "python3") {
soft_ban_file_name_set.insert(dirname(realpath(config.program_name)) + "/__pycode__/");
} else if (config.type == "compiler") {
add_file_permission(config.work_path + "/", 'w');
}
readable_file_name_set.insert(writable_file_name_set.begin(), writable_file_name_set.end());
statable_file_name_set.insert(readable_file_name_set.begin(), readable_file_name_set.end());
}
string read_string_from_addr(reg_val_t addr, pid_t pid) {
int max_len = MAX_PATH_LEN + sizeof(reg_val_t);
char res[max_len + 1], *ptr = res;
while (ptr != res + max_len) {
*(reg_val_t*)ptr = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, pid, addr, NULL);
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(reg_val_t); i++, ptr++, addr++) {
if (*ptr == 0) {
return res;
}
}
}
res[max_len] = 0;
return res;
}
string read_abspath_from_addr(reg_val_t addr, pid_t pid) {
string p = read_string_from_addr(addr, pid);
string a = abspath(p, pid);
if (run_program_config.need_show_trace_details) {
fprintf(stderr, "path : %s -> %s\n", p.c_str(), is_len_valid_path(a) ? a.c_str() : "INVALID!");
}
return a;
}
string read_abspath_from_fd_and_addr(reg_val_t fd, reg_val_t addr, pid_t pid) {
if (fd > MAX_FD_ID && (int)fd != AT_FDCWD) {
return INVALID_PATH;
}
string p = read_string_from_addr(addr, pid);
string a;
if (p.empty()) {
// this case is tricky
// if p is empty, in the following cases, Linux will understand the path as the path of fd:
// newfstatat + AT_EMPTY_PATH, linkat + AT_EMPTY_PATH, execveat + AT_EMPTY_PATH, readlinkat
// otherwise, the syscall will return with an error
// since fd is already opened, the program should have the permission to do the things listed above
// (no read -> write conversion, no deletion, no chmod, etc.)
// we just report this special case. the program will skip the permission check later
a = EMPTY_PATH_AFTER_FD;
} else {
a = abspath(p, pid, (int)fd);
}
if (run_program_config.need_show_trace_details) {
fprintf(stderr, "path : %d, %s -> %s\n", (int)fd, p.c_str(), is_len_valid_path(a) ? a.c_str() : "INVALID!");
}
return a;
}
bool set_seccomp_bpf() {
scmp_filter_ctx ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_TRACE(0));
if (!ctx) {
return false;
}
try {
for (int no : supported_soft_ban_errno_list) {
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(no), SYSCALL_SOFT_BAN_MASK | no, 0) < 0) {
throw system_error();
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < N_SYSCALL; i++) {
if (syscall_info_set[i].extra_check == ECT_NONE) {
if (syscall_info_set[i].should_soft_ban) {
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), i, 0) < 0) {
throw system_error();
}
} else {
if (seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, i, 0) < 0) {
throw system_error();
}
}
}
}
seccomp_load(ctx);
} catch (system_error &e) {
seccomp_release(ctx);
return false;
}
seccomp_release(ctx);
return true;
}
void rp_child_proc::set_error_for_suspicious(const string &error) {
this->suspicious = true;
this->error = "suspicious system call invoked: " + error;
}
void rp_child_proc::set_error_for_kill() {
this->suspicious = false;
reg_val_t sig = this->syscall == __NR_tgkill ? this->reg.REG_ARG2 : this->reg.REG_ARG1;
this->error = "signal sent via " + syscall_name[this->syscall] + ": ";
if (sig != (unsigned)sig) {
this->error += "Unknown signal " + to_string(sig);
} else {
this->error += strsignal((int)sig);
}
}
void rp_child_proc::soft_ban_syscall(int set_no = EPERM) {
this->reg.REG_SYSCALL = SYSCALL_SOFT_BAN_MASK | set_no;
ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, pid, NULL, &this->reg);
}
bool rp_child_proc::check_file_permission(const string &op, const string &fn, char mode) {
string real_fn;
if (!fn.empty()) {
real_fn = mode == 'w' ? realpath_for_write(fn) : realpath(fn);
}
if (!is_len_valid_path(real_fn)) {
// path invalid or file not found
// ban this syscall softly
this->soft_ban_syscall(ENOENT);
return true;
}
string path_proc_self = "/proc/" + to_string(get_tgid_from_pid(this->pid));
if (real_fn.compare(0, path_proc_self.size() + 1, path_proc_self + "/") == 0) {
real_fn = "/proc/self" + real_fn.substr(path_proc_self.size());
} else if (real_fn == path_proc_self) {
real_fn = "/proc/self";
}
bool ok;
switch (mode) {
case 'w':
ok = is_writable_file(real_fn);
break;
case 'r':
ok = is_readable_file(real_fn);
break;
case 's':
ok = is_statable_file(real_fn);
break;
default:
ok = false;
break;
}
if (ok) {
return true;
}
if (run_program_config.need_show_trace_details) {
fprintf(stderr, "check file permission %s : %s\n", op.c_str(), real_fn.c_str());
fprintf(stderr, "[readable]\n");
for (auto s: readable_file_name_set) {
cerr << s << endl;
}
fprintf(stderr, "[writable]\n");
for (auto s: writable_file_name_set) {
cerr << s << endl;
}
}
if (is_soft_ban_file(real_fn)) {
this->soft_ban_syscall(EACCES);
return true;
} else {
this->set_error_for_suspicious("intended to access a file without permission: " + op);
return false;
}
}
bool rp_child_proc::check_safe_syscall() {
ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, pid, NULL, &reg);
int cur_instruction = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKTEXT, pid, reg.rip - 2, NULL) & 0xffff;
if (cur_instruction != 0x050f) {
if (run_program_config.need_show_trace_details) {
fprintf(stderr, "informal syscall %d\n", cur_instruction);
}
this->set_error_for_suspicious("incorrect opcode " + to_string(cur_instruction));
return false;
}
if (0 > (long long int)reg.REG_SYSCALL || (long long int)reg.REG_SYSCALL >= N_SYSCALL) {
this->set_error_for_suspicious(to_string(reg.REG_SYSCALL));
return false;
}
syscall = (int)reg.REG_SYSCALL;
if (run_program_config.need_show_trace_details) {
fprintf(stderr, "[syscall %s]\n", syscall_name[syscall].c_str());
}
this->try_to_create_new_process = syscall == __NR_fork || syscall == __NR_clone || syscall == __NR_clone3 || syscall == __NR_vfork;
auto &cursc = syscall_info_set[syscall];
if (cursc.extra_check & ECT_CNT) {
if (cursc.max_cnt == 0) {
if (cursc.should_soft_ban) {
this->soft_ban_syscall();
return true;
} else {
if (cursc.is_kill) {
this->set_error_for_kill();
} else {
this->set_error_for_suspicious(syscall_name[syscall]);
}
return false;
}
}
cursc.max_cnt--;
}
if (cursc.extra_check & ECT_KILL_SIG0_ALLOWED) {
reg_val_t sig = this->syscall == __NR_tgkill ? this->reg.REG_ARG2 : this->reg.REG_ARG1;
if (sig != 0) {
this->set_error_for_kill();
return false;
}
}
if (cursc.extra_check & ECT_FILE_OP) {
string fn;
if (cursc.extra_check & ECT_END_AT) {
fn = read_abspath_from_fd_and_addr(reg.REG_ARG0, reg.REG_ARG1, pid);
} else {
fn = read_abspath_from_addr(reg.REG_ARG0, pid);
}
string textop = syscall_name[syscall];
char mode = 'w';
if (cursc.extra_check & ECT_CHECK_OPEN_FLAGS) {
reg_val_t flags = cursc.extra_check & ECT_END_AT ? reg.REG_ARG2 : reg.REG_ARG1;
switch (flags & O_ACCMODE) {
case O_RDONLY:
if ((flags & O_CREAT) == 0 && (flags & O_EXCL) == 0 && (flags & O_TRUNC) == 0) {
textop += " (for read)";
mode = 'r';
} else {
textop += " (for read & write)";
}
break;
case O_WRONLY:
textop += " (for write)";
break;
case O_RDWR:
textop += " (for read & write)";
break;
default:
textop += " (with invalid flags)";
break;
}
} else if (cursc.extra_check & ECT_FILE_S) {
mode = 's';
} else if (cursc.extra_check & ECT_FILE_R) {
mode = 'r';
} else if (cursc.extra_check & ECT_FILE_W) {
mode = 'w';
} // else, error!
if (run_program_config.need_show_trace_details) {
fprintf(stderr, "%-8s : %s\n", syscall_name[syscall].c_str(), fn.c_str());
}
if (fn != EMPTY_PATH_AFTER_FD && !check_file_permission(textop, fn, mode)) {
return false;
}
if (cursc.extra_check & ECT_FILE2_S) {
mode = 's';
} else if (cursc.extra_check & ECT_FILE2_R) {
mode = 'r';
} else if (cursc.extra_check & ECT_FILE2_W) {
mode = 'w';
} else {
mode = '?';
}
if (mode != '?') {
if (cursc.extra_check & ECT_END_AT) {
fn = read_abspath_from_fd_and_addr(reg.REG_ARG2, reg.REG_ARG3, pid);
} else {
fn = read_abspath_from_addr(reg.REG_ARG1, pid);
}
if (run_program_config.need_show_trace_details) {
fprintf(stderr, "%-8s : %s\n", syscall_name[syscall].c_str(), fn.c_str());
}
if (fn != EMPTY_PATH_AFTER_FD && !check_file_permission(textop, fn, mode)) {
return false;
}
}
}
if (cursc.extra_check & ECT_CLONE_THREAD) {
reg_val_t flags = reg.REG_ARG0;
if (!(flags & CLONE_THREAD)) {
this->set_error_for_suspicious("intended to create a new process");
return false;
}
auto standard_flags = CLONE_VM | CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES | CLONE_SIGHAND;
standard_flags |= CLONE_SYSVSEM | CLONE_SETTLS |CLONE_PARENT_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID;
if (!(flags & standard_flags)) {
this->set_error_for_suspicious("intended to create a non-standard thread");
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
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